National Security Plan for the Activation and Production of 200 Additional Ships and Aircraft

Objective

In response to escalating threats from China, Russia, and their allies, the United States Navy should aim to activate and produce 200 additional ships and aircraft by January 1, 2027. This initiative would significantly bolster the Navy’s strategic presence across the Pacific and Europe, ensuring readiness in both conventional and hybrid warfare scenarios.

Why the USA Can’t Build Ships Fast Anymore

In recent decades, the United States has faced increasing challenges in rapidly building and deploying naval vessels, a problem driven by a variety of factors that involve economic, technical, and geopolitical issues. One primary reason is the significant decline in shipbuilding infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of shipyards in the U.S. has dwindled dramatically as defense budgets were trimmed and the focus shifted toward smaller, more specialized shipbuilding programs. The U.S. Navy now relies on a handful of major contractors, such as Huntington Ingalls Industries and General Dynamics Electric Boat, and has seen a shrinking workforce. Many smaller, more agile shipyards capable of producing ships quickly have been phased out, making it difficult to scale up production quickly.

Another significant issue is the complexity of modern naval vessels. Today’s ships, especially aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines, are highly advanced and require extensive research, development, and testing. These ships must integrate sophisticated technology for combat operations, electronic warfare, cybersecurity, and missile defense systems, all requiring longer production cycles. Modern ships are not just about the physical hull but also about the integration of cutting-edge technology, which makes the process time-consuming. In addition, many shipyards lack the modern automation or efficient production lines needed to streamline this process, contributing to longer lead times.

A third challenge comes from supply chain vulnerabilities. The global nature of supply chains, especially in industries like steel, electronics, and specialized military equipment, means that issues outside the shipbuilders’ control often cause production delays. The COVID-19 pandemic further exposed weaknesses in the defense industrial base, with suppliers unable to deliver materials or parts promptly. In recent years, even critical materials like rare earth metals have been subject to geopolitical disruptions, particularly from China, which supplies a significant portion of the global supply. With such dependencies on foreign suppliers, increasing U.S. production faces hurdles beyond simple workforce shortages or funding.

Other contributing factors are budget constraints and shifting national priorities. Over the past two decades, U.S. defense budgets have been stretched thin by military engagements abroad, particularly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, funding for naval fleet expansion has often taken a back seat to other priorities, such as air power and cyber defense. Although the U.S. Navy’s strategic importance is clear, political disagreements in Congress and across various branches of government make consistent funding for shipbuilding projects difficult to guarantee. In addition, the costs of modernizing the existing fleet, along with maintaining readiness, further limit the resources allocated for new construction.

Finally, workforce shortages have been a persistent issue in shipbuilding. The industry requires a highly specialized workforce that includes engineers, shipwrights, and skilled laborers. Due to the cyclical nature of defense budgets, training programs have often been inconsistent or underfunded. Furthermore, the aging of the workforce—many of whom are retiring—has created a generational gap in the shipbuilding trades. The lack of a sufficiently trained and experienced labor force means that shipyards struggle to ramp up production quickly, even when funds are available. This problem is compounded by the high degree of specialization required for each vessel and the long-term investment needed to cultivate talent.

Hiring Requirements to Meet Shipbuilding Goals

To rapidly expand the U.S. Navy’s fleet, a substantial workforce would need to be mobilized across multiple levels. The number of civilian employees needed at shipyards alone would likely exceed 100,000 individuals, encompassing a broad array of roles from engineers and naval architects to laborers and machine operators. This workforce would be needed not only for the physical construction of the ships but also for design, testing, and logistical support. Contractor hires would also play a significant role, as private-sector companies involved in components such as weapons systems, propulsion, and electronics would need to ramp up production. Depending on the level of subcontracting, hundreds of thousands of contractor positions might be required across the country to meet production schedules.

In addition to traditional shipyard workers, new military personnel would need to be hired and trained to support these ships once constructed. This includes sailors, officers, engineers, and maintenance crews responsible for operating and repairing the ships post-launch. The Navy would likely need to boost the active-duty force by approximately 10-15% to support an expanded fleet. The training pipeline for these new recruits would have to be significantly accelerated, potentially requiring the Navy to modify its training programs to accommodate the influx. Additionally, specialized contractors who provide technical and operational training for advanced systems aboard new ships would be essential to ensure the crew is prepared to operate and maintain complex platforms.

The hiring and training processes would span several states, with major shipyards, such as Norfolk, Virginia, San Diego, California, Groton, Connecticut, and Puget Sound, Washington, at the forefront. These locations would serve as the hubs for the work required to build, test, and deploy the ships. Support would also be necessary from training centers across the country to ensure that personnel are ready to man the new fleet as soon as the ships are finished.

Securing the Build-Out as a National Power Strategy

As the U.S. Navy ramps up its shipbuilding efforts, it is essential to safeguard the process from both foreign interference and domestic inefficiencies. One key approach to security is ensuring operational security (OPSEC) at every level of the process, from design to deployment. This can be accomplished by enforcing strict non-disclosure agreements and compartmentalizing sensitive information. Shipbuilding yards, especially those working on high-profile military vessels like aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines, must implement extensive cybersecurity measures to protect their intellectual property and systems. Tight control of sensitive plans, blueprints, and designs is necessary to avoid the risk of espionage, particularly from adversaries like China and Russia.

Physical security at shipyards must be a priority, in addition to cybersecurity. Contractors, military personnel, and civilian workers involved in shipbuilding should undergo thorough background checks and security vetting. For sensitive projects, personnel access should be restricted to those with the proper clearances, ensuring that only authorized individuals are allowed to view or work on classified systems. Security measures should extend to shipping, logistics, and storage facilities where critical components are produced and transported, as these areas may also be vulnerable to sabotage or theft.

Lastly, the Navy and its contractors should actively foster a culture of innovation and resilience to ensure that supply chain vulnerabilities do not impact the project. This could include diversifying suppliers to reduce the risk of relying on single sources for critical components, especially in light of potential disruptions from global events. Additionally, redundant manufacturing and assembly facilities should be considered in different parts of the country to avoid bottlenecks or slowdowns at any one location. By securing both the physical and intellectual components of the build-out, the U.S. Navy can protect its efforts to expand its fleet to maintain national power and readiness.

The Strategic Value of Operational Legacy Ships in Modern Naval Power

In an era of rapidly evolving threats and limited timelines, the strategic value of operational legacy ships—older vessels still capable of effective combat—cannot be overstated. While the desire for new, cutting-edge ships is understandable, it is important to recognize that existing ships, particularly those with the capability to engage in combat, offer a significant and immediate advantage in a crisis. The reality is that constructing new ships is a time-intensive process, and in the face of potential conflict, the Navy’s priorities must shift toward effectively leveraging its current assets. Older ships, especially those with modernized systems, are ready for deployment now, providing a tangible deterrent against adversaries without the wait for new vessels to enter service.

Older ships that can still fire, such as Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers, have been equipped with advanced weapon systems over the years, including Aegis Combat Systems and Standard Missiles, allowing them to remain highly effective in modern combat situations. Although these platforms are older, they can integrate modern technologies and can be quickly reactivated and upgraded with improvements in radar, missile systems, and cyber defense mechanisms. This adaptability makes them valuable assets that can be customized to counter contemporary threats like anti-ship missiles, submarine warfare, and electronic warfare—essential elements of any modern naval conflict. Notably, they can be deployed much faster than any new ship that is still in the design, construction, or testing phases.

In addition to their combat readiness, legacy ships also provide strategic depth. The time needed to build, test, and commission new ships is substantial—often spanning several years. A build-out of 200 ships for the Navy, as discussed previously, could take decades to finalize, creating a gap in capabilities that adversaries may exploit. Conversely, utilizing existing ships that are fully operational and capable of engaging in combat enables the U.S. Navy to maintain a strong global presence while new ships are under development. This operational continuity is crucial for ensuring that the Navy keeps a force that is not only technologically advanced but also well-practiced in combat operations and interoperability with allied forces.

Besides immediate readiness, older ships offer a cost-effective solution in light of budget constraints. While building new ships demands significant investments in facilities, research, development, and manpower, activating and upgrading older vessels can be achieved at a fraction of the cost. This strategy enables the Navy to maximize its return on investment in the current fleet while simultaneously financing the construction of future ships. Furthermore, operational older ships present an opportunity to extend the service life of already paid-for assets, reducing pressure on defense budgets and providing a sustainable approach that balances immediate needs with long-term objectives.

Finally, the importance of tactical flexibility in modern naval warfare cannot be overstated. In situations where the Navy is forced to deploy rapidly or engage in a conflict on short notice, the advantage lies with the forces that can mobilize immediately. Legacy ships, already integrated into the Navy’s global logistics and maintenance networks, are in a position to deploy with minimal preparation, providing a powerful deterrent or direct response to threats. Waiting for new ships to be built creates a vulnerability, as it would leave gaps in the Navy’s ability to project power. By investing in the continued operational use and modernization of older vessels, the Navy ensures it can meet the demands of emerging threats today and tomorrow.

Shipbuilding and Activation Program

The Navy must address critical gaps in its force structure to counter both peer adversaries (China and Russia) and their regional allies. Given the timeline and strategic need for rapid deployment, the plan incorporates a mixture of new construction, reactivation of mothballed ships, and upgrades to older platforms. The ships and aircraft selected must balance traditional power projection and asymmetric advantages, such as unmanned systems and cyber capabilities.

Ship Classes and Types:

1. Aircraft Carriers (CVN): 4 additional.
2. Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD/LHA): 6 additional.
3. Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyers (DDG): 20 additional.
4. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS): 40 additional.
5. Fast Combat Support Ships (AOE): 10 additional.
6. Auxiliary Ships (T-AKE, T-AO, etc.): 30 additional.
7. Submarines (SSN-774 Virginia-Class): 6 additional.
8. Combat Logistics Ships: 10 additional.
9. Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs): 20 additional.
10. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs): 20 additional.
11. Landing Ship Tank (LST): 10 additional.

Additional Analysis:

• Unmanned Systems: The development and deployment of unmanned systems (both air and sea) provide strategic advantages but also face challenges due to electronic warfare (EW) and spectrum denial capabilities from China and Russia. The Navy will need to harden these unmanned systems against jamming and denial tactics while maintaining interoperability with manned platforms.
• Mothballed Ships: Reactivating mothballed ships , such as older cruisers, frigates, and support vessels, provides a significant cost-effective option. However, older ships require more crew and have higher maintenance and upkeep costs.

Aircraft Activation and Production Program

Aircraft will be crucial for achieving air superiority and enhancing strike capabilities, particularly on aircraft carriers. Given the expected electromagnetic interference in contested zones, the Navy must be prepared to face challenges with unmanned aircraft and aircraft integration with surface and subsurface platforms.

Aircraft Types:

1. F/A-18 Hornets (Reactivation): Additional 150 aircraft, reactivated from mothball storage.
2. F/A-18 Super Hornets: 100 new aircraft.
3. F-35C Lightning II (Carrier-Based): 100 additional aircraft.
4. P-8 Poseidon: 50 additional aircraft for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
5. EA-18G Growler: 25 additional aircraft for electronic warfare.
6. E-2D Hawkeye: 15 additional for airborne early warning and control (AEW&C).

Additional Analysis:

• Mothballed Aircraft: Reactivating older aircraft such as F/A-18 Hornets, P-3 Orions, and S-3 Vikings could significantly speed up production timelines for additional airborne ISR and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. These aircraft would provide valuable experience for the operational crews while newer aircraft are produced.
• Advanced EW Systems: The EA-18G Growler is critical for electronic warfare and will protect both manned and unmanned systems. Deploying these aircraft in contested areas will ensure that the fleet can conduct operations in denied environments.

Personnel Requirements

The 200 additional ships and aircraft will require a significant increase in manpower. As expected, older ships and aircraft systems require more personnel for maintenance and operational readiness. The following personnel estimates have been expanded with additional analysis for crew training and integration.

Ship Class	Crew per Ship	Total Personnel for 200 Ships
Aircraft Carriers (CVN)	3,000	12,000
Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD)	1,000	6,000
Destroyers (DDG)	300	6,000
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)	100	4,000
Fast Combat Support Ships (AOE)	200	2,000
Auxiliary Ships	150	4,500
Submarines (SSN-774)	150	900
Combat Logistics Ships	100	1,000
Unmanned Surface Vessels	0	0
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles	0	0

Training Programs:

• Naval Academies: Expanded training to include new platforms and specialized courses for unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and integrated operations.
• Flight Schools: Expanded flight training for the F/A-18 Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and P-8 Poseidon.
• Crew Integration: Increased focus on multidisciplinary training for crews operating across ship types, with specific attention to cybersecurity, joint operations, and asymmetric warfare tactics.

Shipbuilding and Work Locations

Shipbuilding, modernization, and aircraft production will be distributed across multiple facilities to leverage regional capabilities and expedite construction. This multi-location approach provides flexibility, with a focus on modular construction to allow ships to be built in stages and deployed quickly.

Key Locations:

• Newport News Shipbuilding (Virginia) – Aircraft Carriers, Submarines
• Bath Iron Works (Maine) – Destroyers
• General Dynamics Electric Boat (Connecticut) – Submarines
• Ingalls Shipbuilding (Mississippi) – Amphibious Assault Ships, Destroyers
• Avondale Shipyards (Louisiana) – Auxiliary Ships
• San Diego (California) – Littoral Combat Ships, Auxiliary Ships
• AMARC (Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center) (Arizona) – Aircraft Reactivation
• Tucson, Arizona (UAV manufacturing)

Integration with Current Force Structure

• Newly activated ships will integrate with existing task forces to ensure immediate availability for operations. These ships will initially focus on logistical support, maritime patrol roles, and counter-ASW operations, gradually transitioning into combat roles as crews are fully trained and ships are operational.
• The new aircraft carriers, submarines, and Amphibious Assault Ships will enhance the Navy’s forward-deployed capabilities, ensuring that the U.S. Navy maintains a global presence to project power in critical regions.
• Unmanned Systems will bolster operations in contested environments, providing a rapid-response capability when manned assets are at risk.

Financial Considerations and Incremental Budget Increases

Given the scope and complexity of this plan, incremental funding is required to meet the 2027 deadline. The following outlines the phased funding increases for the next three years:

Year	Base Budget Increase ($B)	Key Areas of Spend
2025	$12.0B	Shipbuilding (DDGs, LCS, Subs)
2026	$20.0B	Aircraft Reactivation, CVN, LHD
2027	$25.0B	Final Ship Deliveries, Training

Challenges and Strategic Considerations

• Adversary Capabilities: Both China and Russia have sophisticated anti-ship missile systems, submarine fleets, and air defenses that will challenge traditional naval superiority. This requires a focus on electronic warfare, asymmetric warfare, and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies.
• Supply Chain Challenges: Shipbuilding and aircraft production depend on a global supply chain that integrates materials, electronics, and systems. To mitigate risks, efforts must be made to diversify sources and increase domestic production.
• Personnel Management: Integrating new ships and aircraft while training a large number of additional personnel will strain the human capital available. This will require an expanded training infrastructure, increased incentives for recruits, and careful management of overseas assignments.

Mothballed Ships: Reactivation Candidates

The U.S. Navy maintains a number of ships in a mothballed fleet that could be reactivated to quickly increase the operational fleet. Below is a list of mothballed ships that could be considered for reactivation, particularly older platforms that might be brought back into service for logistical support, patrol duties, or secondary combat roles.

Aircraft Carriers (CV):

• USS Enterprise (CVN-65): Decommissioned in 2017, this was the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. It could be reactivated after extensive upgrades.
• USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67): This Kitty Hawk-class carrier was decommissioned in 2007. While aging, it may be brought back into service for support roles after upgrades.
• USS Independence (CV-62): This Constellation-class aircraft carrier was decommissioned in 1998 and could be considered for reactivation with modern systems if needed.

Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA/LHD):

• USS Tarawa (LHA-1): Decommissioned in 2009, this Tarawa-class amphibious assault ship could be brought back into service for amphibious operations or humanitarian missions.
• USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7): While not entirely mothballed, it has had a reduced operational schedule and could be refitted and reactivated for additional support.

Cruisers (CG):

• USS Long Beach (CGN-9): The world’s first nuclear-powered cruiser, decommissioned in 1995. Although it’s an older ship, it could potentially be reactivated after significant refitting.
• USS Virginia (CGN-38): Another nuclear-powered cruiser, decommissioned in 1994, could be brought back for limited support or specialized missions.

Destroyers (DDG):

• USS Dahlgren (DDG-43): A Charles F. Adams-class destroyer, decommissioned in 1993.
• USS McGowan (DDG-39): Another Charles F. Adams-class destroyer, decommissioned in 1994. Reactivating these ships may be useful for secondary patrols and defense operations.

Frigates (FFG):

• USS Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7): This class of frigates was decommissioned in 2015. They could be reactivated and modernized to serve as littoral combat vessels or for escort duty.
• USS Stark (FFG-31): Decommissioned in 1999, this Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate could potentially be upgraded with modern systems and used for operations in low-intensity conflict zones.

Submarines (SSN):

• USS Seawolf (SSN-21): The Seawolf-class attack submarine, one of the most advanced nuclear-powered submarines ever built, was decommissioned prematurely in 2005 due to high operational costs. Reactivating it could significantly increase the Navy’s submarine force projection.
• USS Alexandria (SSN-757): Another Los Angeles-class submarine, decommissioned in 2022, could be returned to service if the Navy faces a shortage of operational submarines.

Auxiliary Ships:

• USS Saratoga (CV-60): Decommissioned in 1994, this Forrestal-class aircraft carrier could be used as a support vessel, such as a training ship, after an extensive refit.
• USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15): Decommissioned in 2017, it served as an amphibious transport dock and could be brought back into service for expeditionary warfare and logistics support.

Others (LCU, LST, AOE):

• USS Ponce (LPD-15): Recommissioned as an Afloat Forward Staging Base but decommissioned in 2017, it could be repurposed as a logistics and operations base in key locations.
• USS Newport (LST-1179): Decommissioned in 1993, this tank landing ship was modernized and could now serve in amphibious operations.

Challenges of Reactivation

While reactivating mothballed ships provides a potentially fast and cost-effective solution, significant challenges exist:

• Maintenance: Mothballed ships have often deteriorated over time, and their systems and hulls require extensive repairs and upgrades to meet modern operational standards.
• Crew Integration: Crew training for these older ships must be accelerated, which could increase personnel requirements.
• Technology Gaps: Many mothballed ships are equipped with outdated technology, requiring extensive retrofitting to support modern warfare capabilities, especially in cybersecurity, electronic warfare, and missile defense.

By reactivating mothballed ships, the U.S. Navy can potentially expand its fleet more quickly while also focusing resources on the construction of next-generation vessels. This strategy allows for a hybrid approach that utilizes both modern and older platforms to meet various operational needs, particularly in lower-risk environments, while more advanced vessels are built for high-end warfighting scenarios. However, careful attention must be given to balancing modernization costs with operational effectiveness.

Comparison of the Cost Over Three Years: Legacy Ship Modernization vs. Two Aircraft Carriers and Modern Aircraft Load-Out

Legacy Ship Modernization Program:

The cost of activating and modernizing 200 legacy ships, as outlined in previous analyses, includes several key components: reactivation, upgrades to weaponry and defense systems, maintenance, personnel costs, and associated infrastructure improvements. In this comparison, the following key aspects are taken into consideration:

1. Reactivation and Modernization Costs:
   • Reactivating and upgrading older ships, particularly those with established systems such as the Aegis Combat System and Standard Missiles, will incur costs primarily from electronic warfare upgrades, radar modernization, and missile system improvements.
   • The total cost for reactivating and modernizing 200 ships across various classes could be $60 billion to $80 billion over three years. The cost of modernizing each ship, including upgrades, could range between $250 million to $400 million per ship, depending on the class and level of modification required.
2. Personnel Costs:
   • A significant portion of the cost of reactivating these ships will be the hiring and training of personnel. Given that older ships tend to require larger crews, an estimated 200 to 250 personnel per ship could be needed for each of the reactivated vessels, leading to an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 new hires.
   • This cost includes training, salaries, benefits, and operational expenses, which could add another $15 billion to $20 billion over the three-year period.
3. Infrastructure and Base Expansion:
   • Reactivating older ships would require expanding shipyards, logistics support, and maintenance facilities. Investments in physical infrastructure and technological resources would also be needed to support the additional operational ships. Over the course of three years, this cost would likely total around $10 billion to $15 billion .

Total Estimated Cost for Legacy Ship Modernization Program Over Three Years:

• The total cost for this program could range between $85 billion and $115 billion over the three-year timeline.

Building Two Aircraft Carriers and Modern Aircraft Load-Out:

Building and commissioning two new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with the necessary aircraft load-out is a significantly more capital-intensive endeavor. The following breakdown compares this approach:

1. Aircraft Carrier Construction Costs:
   • The cost of building a modern aircraft carrier, such as the Ford-class carrier, is estimated to be between $13 billion and $15 billion per ship, depending on the specifics of the build. This includes construction, systems integration, and initial testing.
   • For two aircraft carriers, this would amount to $26 billion to $30 billion.
2. Aircraft Procurement and Load-Out:
   • Modern aircraft like the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18 Super Hornet are the typical aircraft choices for deployment on these carriers. The cost of each F-35C is approximately $100 million per unit, and the cost of F/A-18 Super Hornets is around $70 million each.
   • The Navy would require about 40 to 60 aircraft per carrier to fully load both, depending on mission requirements and air wing configuration. The estimated total cost for procuring and equipping the air wing could range from $6 billion to $8 billion per carrier, or $12 billion to $16 billion for both.
3. Personnel Costs:
   • An aircraft carrier typically requires a crew of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 personnel, including those engaged in operations, maintenance, and aviation tasks. For two carriers, the Navy would need to recruit and train an additional 8,000 to 10,000 sailors.
   • Personnel costs (salaries, benefits, training, and logistics) would likely add another $10 billion to $12 billion over the course of three years.
4. Operational and Maintenance Costs:
   • The ongoing operational and maintenance costs for these carriers—covering fuel, equipment, training, and upkeep—could add another $2 billion to $4 billion annually. Over three years, this would total about $6 billion to $12 billion.

Total Estimated Cost for Building Two Aircraft Carriers and Aircraft Over Three Years:

• The total cost for this approach would likely range between $54 billion and $70 billion over the three-year timeline.

Comparison and Conclusion:

• Legacy Ship Modernization Program (200 ships): $85 billion to $115 billion
• Two Aircraft Carriers and Modern Aircraft Load-Out: $54 billion to $70 billion

From a financial perspective, building and equipping two new aircraft carriers with modern aircraft is less expensive than modernizing 200 legacy ships, even when considering construction, aircraft procurement, and personnel costs. However, this comparison does not consider the strategic value and operational flexibility of modernizing older ships. Reactivating and upgrading existing ships results in a more significant increase in fleet size and operational capacity, enabling a broader global presence in a shorter timeframe without delaying the construction and commissioning of new ships.

The decision ultimately depends on the Navy’s strategic priorities: if the objective is to quickly expand fleet size and maintain a more versatile presence, modernizing legacy ships offers a better return on investment. Conversely, if the focus is on enhancing naval power projection and air superiority, constructing aircraft carriers provides a long-term advantage with greater capabilities in air operations, although it results in fewer ships overall. Both strategies have merit, and a balanced approach that includes both options may offer the optimal solution for the Navy’s future operational requirements. In the end, you don’t have to sacrifice aircraft carriers or any other priorities to achieve the ability to respond in two theaters in a way that currently does not exist. 

Concerns and Responses

Establishment Concern: Legacy Ships and Technological Limitations

Concern: The Navy and defense establishment may contend that relying on legacy ships undermines the Navy’s technological advantage. Despite modernization, older ships may struggle to integrate seamlessly with the most advanced technologies necessary to counter contemporary threats from China, Russia, and other near-peer adversaries. These legacy vessels might have limitations in radar systems, missile defense capabilities, and combat systems that newer, purpose-built ships are better equipped to manage. The Navy could assert that older ships would not perform effectively in a highly contested, technology-centric environment and could be susceptible to advanced electronic warfare, anti-ship missiles, and cyberattacks.

Refutation: Modernizing older ships is not merely about keeping them afloat; it’s about enhancing their capabilities to remain competitive in contemporary combat environments. Many legacy ships, such as Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, have been effectively modernized with Aegis BMD, advanced missile defense systems, and next-generation radar and communication systems. The integration of new technologies, including cyber defense systems, electronic warfare suites, and advanced missile systems, guarantees that these ships are highly capable in modern theaters. Although they may not possess all the latest systems, their combat effectiveness is improved, rendering them valuable assets in a multi-layered naval strategy.

Establishment Concern: Increased Maintenance and Long-Term Costs

Concern: The Navy may worry that modernizing older ships, though initially less expensive than constructing new ones, could lead to significantly higher long-term maintenance costs. Aging vessels experience more wear and tear on their hulls and internal systems, making them susceptible to more frequent breakdowns as they get older. Keeping up with and upgrading these ships would involve costly repairs, extensive overhauls, and greater logistical efforts, potentially resulting in increased operational costs over time. This situation could redirect resources that might have been allocated for new ship construction or more advanced platforms.

Refutation: While it is true that maintenance costs can rise with age, many legacy ships have undergone significant upgrades and will continue to serve with reduced maintenance needs following modernization. Upgrades focused on automation, including in weapons systems, damage control, and propulsion, can lessen the strain on mechanical systems and enhance the longevity of the vessels. Additionally, older ships can be upgraded incrementally, ensuring a more cost-effective approach to fleet expansion. The initial investment in upgrades may be less than that for new ships, and the operational effectiveness of these ships will continue to improve, yielding a high return on investment over time.

Establishment Concern: Delayed New Platform Development

Concern: A major concern for the Navy is that concentrating on modernizing older ships may delay the development and deployment of next-generation platforms, such as the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) and the large, advanced amphibious assault ships designed to tackle future missions. These new platforms are viewed as crucial to the Navy’s long-term strategic needs, which include enhanced capabilities in anti-submarine warfare, air superiority, cyber defense, and unmanned systems. Should resources be allocated to legacy ships, this may hinder the development and production of these next-generation vessels, which are essential for future naval supremacy.

Refutation: Modernizing legacy ships can be seen as a complementary strategy rather than just a replacement for constructing new ships. The Navy can pursue both options simultaneously, upgrading older ships to address current operational needs while building new ones to counter future threats. The time required to field new ships can span several years or even decades, whereas reactivating older ships can deliver immediate operational capacity in a matter of months to a couple of years. This approach enables the Navy to fulfill both current and near-term requirements without compromising long-term modernization efforts. Moreover, legacy ships can function as a temporary solution while newer ships are developed, thus preventing a gap in naval capability.

Establishment Concern: Personnel and Training Burden

Concern: One significant concern is the impact of reactivating legacy ships on personnel. The Navy would need to hire or reassign approximately 40,000 to 50,000 new sailors to operate these reactivated ships, which would place a heavy burden on the Navy’s existing recruitment, training, and retention programs. These personnel would require specialized training for older systems, potentially causing disruptions in readiness as the Navy adapts to the increased demand for sailors. Additionally, the Navy might face increased logistical challenges regarding crew management and maintaining high levels of operational readiness across a larger number of vessels.

Refutation: The challenge of expanding personnel can be alleviated by adopting automation in key operational areas, thereby reducing the need for large crews on many of these legacy ships. Vessels like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and offshore patrol vessels can be equipped with autonomous systems for navigation, surveillance, and even weapons control, which further diminishes the number of crew members needed. Additionally, many legacy ships can be modernized to lower crew requirements through technological upgrades and improved operational procedures. With suitable investments in crew training programs and the development of new automated systems, the personnel burden can be managed effectively.

Establishment Concern: Political and Bureaucratic Resistance

Concern: Political and bureaucratic resistance to the proposal is likely. Many stakeholders, including defense contractors, lawmakers, and military leaders, are invested in the current strategy of building new ships and modernizing existing fleets with the latest technologies. These stakeholders may oppose the transition to a legacy ship modernization strategy, as it would disrupt current procurement schedules, contracts, and budgets. Defense contractors may be especially worried about losing contracts for new ship construction in favor of retrofitting older vessels, which could impact their revenue and employment levels.

Refutation: The proposal to modernize legacy ships could indeed garner bipartisan support as it addresses pressingnational defense needs while generating jobs and economic activity in shipyards and defense industries nationwide. Modernization efforts would enable short-term fleet expansion, providing immediate advantages in operational readiness. The incremental nature of these investments allows for a seamless connection with long-term plans for building new platforms, ensuring that the proposal does not replace or impede future procurement efforts. By framing the modernization effort as a short-term solution to meet urgent operational needs, the proposal would resonate with both military strategists and political leaders, while allowing the Navy to persist in its long-term modernization initiatives.

Conclusion

In light of the urgent need to bolster U.S. naval power to counter the growing threats posed by China, Russia, and their allies, the proposal to activate and modernize legacy ships presents a pragmatic and cost-effective solution. With a target date of January 1, 2027, for fielding an additional 200 ships, the strategy offers a pathway to rapid fleet expansion. While building entirely new vessels would take years and require substantial financial and personnel investments, reactivating and modernizing existing ships allows the Navy to immediately address capability gaps, ensuring a robust presence in critical regions. Legacy ships, when upgraded with advanced technologies, can serve as effective deterrents and contribute significantly to the overall force structure.

The primary advantage of this strategy lies in the speed and cost-effectiveness of modernizing legacy ships. With relatively lower upfront costs compared to constructing new ships, this approach offers the flexibility to rapidly scale the fleet without overburdening the national defense budget. Moreover, the cost of reactivating and modernizing these ships is far more manageable than building entirely new platforms, which would be prohibitively expensive in such a short timeline. This approach not only provides more ships quickly but also ensures that the U.S. Navy maintains its edge by updating older platforms with state-of-the-art systems, extending their operational life and combat readiness.

However, this proposal does not come without challenges. The Navy would need to address the logistical hurdles of reactivating older ships, including the need for significant crew expansions, retraining efforts, and the potential strain on maintenance and support systems. The complexities of integrating new technologies into legacy platforms could also present hurdles in terms of compatibility and operational efficiency. Nevertheless, these challenges are not insurmountable. With strategic planning, investments in automation, and a focus on reducing crew requirements through system upgrades, the Navy can mitigate many of these concerns, ensuring that these ships serve as a formidable force in the immediate term.

A key concern raised by the establishment centers around the long-term viability of relying on older ships. While newer, purpose-built vessels undoubtedly offer superior capabilities, the reality of rapid fleet expansion requires leveraging all available resources. The Navy’s focus on next-generation ships, such as the Future Surface Combatant (FSC), does not preclude the modernization of existing ships. Rather, the two strategies can complement each other, with legacy ship upgrades providing a bridging solution while the Navy continues to pursue cutting-edge platforms for future needs. This approach ensures that the Navy can meet both current and future threats without compromising its long-term strategic vision.

In conclusion, the activation and modernization of legacy ships represents a viable, effective solution to meet the pressing need for expanded naval power. It enables the U.S. Navy to rapidly increase its fleet size while maintaining operational readiness and cost control. Though challenges exist in terms of personnel, integration, and technological adaptation, these obstacles can be managed with careful planning, strategic investments, and technological upgrades. Ultimately, this proposal strengthens the U.S. Navy’s position in the global maritime power dynamic, enhancing its ability to confront adversaries and protect national security in the face of evolving geopolitical threats.